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DCI BRIEFING

- I. The intelligence community is now preparing its annual estimates of the main trends in Soviet general capabilities and policies -- and Soviet capabilities for strategic attacks through mid-1964.
- II. First, Capabilities and Policies:
 - A. The Soviet leaders currently show great confidence that they believe trend of events is in their favor.
 1. Their rate of economic progress, their scientific achievements, their growing missile capabilities, and their estimate of the political tendencies in underdeveloped countries all suggest to them a favorable shift in world power relations.
 2. From the position of strength which they believe they now have, they feel able, not only to engage the West vigorously on disputed issues when they wish to do so, but also to relax tensions when expedient without any imputation of weakness.

DOE review completed.

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- B. In Soviet external policy, over the next five years, we expect to see elements of pressure and detente combined and varied as tactical advantage may suggest.
1. Whatever changes of emphasis may occur, the swings of policy are likely to fall within a range which excludes:
 - a. On the one hand, deliberate assumption of serious and uncontrollable risks of general war; or
 - b. On the other, any abandonment of the concept of continuing struggle between two irreconcilable worlds.
 2. In another year or two, Soviet leaders may seek to draw political advantage from their improved power position relative to the West if it emerges as they expect.
 - a. They will still try to win concessions basically through negotiation.
 - b. But the element of pressure and threat will probably become more pronounced.
 - c. The chances of miscalculation may be increased.

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III. It is in the context of this general estimate that I wish to present our ~~current~~ estimate of the developing Soviet capabilities for strategic attack.

A. These Soviet capabilities undergoing major transition.

1. Has rested primarily in long and medium range bombers with nuclear bombs, some with air-to-surface missiles.
2. Bomber force is now being increasingly supplemented by ground-launched ballistic missiles and missile-launching submarines.
3. Increasing ballistic missile capability will become main element in Soviet strategic threat. During 1960 it will begin to be a threat against industrial and population complexes in the USA -- and by 1961 threat against our retaliatory power.

IV. USSR made considerable progress in ballistic missiles during 1959.

A. Soviet ICBM test-firing program has proceeded in orderly manner -- while evidence still inadequate to judge precise timing. we believe that for planning purposes we should

consider that by 1 January 1960, USSR had initial operational capability with a few (say, 10) series produced ICBMs.

Graphic 1.

1. To date there have been about 20 Soviet ICBM firings to 3,500 nautical miles or more. Fifteen of them in 1959, including long shots into Pacific. Also some failures, of course.
 2. Soviet ICBM probably capable of carrying 6,000 pound nuclear warhead with multimegaton yield to 5,500 nautical miles.
 3. CEP: under operational conditions will probably be between 3 and 5 n.m. initially and may be improved down to 2. n.m. Some difference of opinion in intelligence community as to when this improvement might be achieved, and this question is under current study.
- B. For delivery of nuclear warheads against land targets at medium ranges, and this would include most of our overseas bases, USSR has had 700 n.m. ballistic missiles available for the past few years, and we believe 1,100 n.m. missiles became operational in late 1958 or early 1959.
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1. Estimate that both types are in series production.
2. Believe troops have trained with both, and have some evidence of their deployment in East Germany and possibly Soviet Far East.
3. Know little about the deployment of ICBMs.
Khrushchev boasted that they are mobile.

C. A few conventionally-powered Soviet submarines now evaluated as probably capable of launching ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, though not from a submerged position.

1. One type of modified long-range submarine can probably carry two missiles of 200 n.m. or possibly 350 n.m. range.
2. A newly-constructed class which was first identified in 1959 may carry about 5 missiles of 350 n.m. range.
3. Based on requirements and technical capabilities, estimate that in 1961-1963 USSR will first achieve a weapon system combining a nuclear-powered submarine with a 500-1,000 n.m. ballistic missile, capable of launching from submerged position.
4. Believe they now have a few nuclear subs--but not identified.

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V. Jet medium and heavy bomber strength of Soviet Long Range Aviation remained relatively constant over past year.

A. Long Range Aviation now has about 1,100 BADGER jet medium bombers (B-47 type) and about 120 BISON jet (B-52 type) and BEAR turboprop heavy bombers, (120 in all).

1. BEAR production (military type) ceased some time ago, BADGER production ceased in about mid-1959, BISON production continues at a low rate (one to two a month in fall of 1959).
2. Obsolescent BULL piston medium bombers (B-29 type) retired rapidly in the past year--probably now completely phased out of Long Range Aviation units.

B. Long Range Aviation remains best suited to operations against targets closer in than the US--for example in Europe.

1. Majority of bombers are BADGERs capable of reaching most US targets only on one-way missions.
2. From Arctic bases, refuelled BISONs could reach US targets on two-way missions--BEARs could do so without refuelling.

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C. In about 1961 USSR will probably have a supersonic air-launched missile of at least 350 n.m. range, adaptable for use against land targets or ships at sea.

VI. Soviet rulers probably regard their present forces as capable of inflicting great damage on US and Allied concentrations of population and industry, but as incapable of preventing the nuclear devastation of the USSR.

VII. Future growth of Soviet intercontinental striking capabilities will be primarily a function of development, production, and deployment of ICBMs.

VIII. In absence of evidence on Soviet plans and programs, intelligence community has analyzed the ICBM force goals, which the Soviets might establish over the next few years.

This analysis shows that the USSR would probably estimate that it would have in 1961, its most favorable opportunity, through rapid buildup in ICBMs, to gain decided military, political, and psychological advantage over the US.

A. After about that time, our own planned increase in semihardened and hardened US ICBM sites would result in very steep increase in Soviet ICBM requirements to knock them out.

B. Soviets would probably not regard what they could achieve in ICBMs between now and 1961 as giving them a "decisive military superiority"--would still have to expect retaliation from:

- 1. Our bombers on airborne alert.**
- 2. Semihardened and hardened ICBM sites.**
- 3. Carriers and missile-launching submarines at sea.**
- 4. Any other bases they failed to neutralize.**

C. They would probably continue to regard our retaliatory forces as threatening to inflict unacceptable damage on Soviet industrial and population centers.

IX. Present indications are that Soviet ICBM program is not a "crash" program. But we believe it is designed to provide a substantial ICBM capability at an early date.

A. Goal is probably a force as large as they think necessary for substantial deterrent and pre-emptive attack capability.

- 1. That is! -- a capability to seize the initiative from an enemy who is himself believed to be preparing to attack.**

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- 2. This would/ consistent with present deliberate and orderly tempo of Soviet ICBM test firings.**
- 3. And with Soviet policy of maintaining balance among various types of military forces.**

B. Conclusion of USIB is that present Soviet ICBM program would provide some 140-200 ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961. This assumes a total inventory of 175-270 and a total production of ²²⁵⁻³⁵⁰ ~~225-350~~.

1. Production of missiles could be accomplished with one or two plants -- bulk of effort would be in constructing launching facilities, activating and training ICBM units, and providing logistic support for them.
2. Even to have 140 ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961 would require a vigorous program -- to have 200 at that time would introduce considerably greater difficulties.
3. But such programs could be accomplished by mid-1961, along with other Soviet military programs, without appreciably hindering present Soviet plans for industrial development -- 7-Year Plan goals.

C. There is a fairly broad spread in our estimate of the trend in the Soviet ICBM force after 1961.

1. Based on present evidence of Soviet policies and programs, our estimate of Soviet ICBMs on launcher is in the range of 250-350 in mid-1962 and in the range of 350-450 in mid-1963.

2. Air Force intelligence feels that the growth of the force after 1961 will be considerably greater than this.
 3. But all of us in the intelligence community recognize that the course of the Soviet program is likely to be affected by changing technology and by developments in the international situation.
 4. Hence we believe that any numerical projections, particularly beyond 1961, must be carefully and continuously reviewed in the light of all evidence we may obtain as to the urgency and priority which the Soviets give to their ICBM program.
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